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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:

JERRY DALE LOYA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20010058-CA
Priority No. 2

:

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction1 for Receiving or Transferring a Stolen
Vehicle, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998), in the
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Judith S. Atherton, Judge, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e)
(1996).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court err in denying the motion of Appellant Jerry Dale Loya ["Mr. Loya"]
for a directed verdict where there is insufficient evidence to convict him of Receiving or
Transferring a Stolen Vehicle?

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
In evaluating a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict, this
1

A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment," R. 150-51, is
attached in Addendum A.

Court views ""the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v.
Humphrey. 793 P.2d 918, 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(citation omitted). "When the findings of all
the requisite elements of the crime can be reasonably made from the evidence and all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from it, our inquiry stops, and we sustain the verdict." Id
This issue is preserved on the record at R. 169 [119].

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION
The following statue is relevant on appeal. Utah Code Annotated section 41-la-1316
provides:
It is a second degree felony for a person:
(1) with intent to procure or pass title to a motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that
he knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken to receive
or transfer possession of the motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer from or to
another; or
(2) to have in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that he
knows or has reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a
peace officer engaged at the time in the performance of his duty.
Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (1998).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 5 February 1999, nearly two years after the incident at issue in this case, Mr. Loya
was charged by information with one count of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (1998). R. 3-5. An arrest warrant was issued. R. 7-8.
On September 20th and 21 st , 2000, approximately one and a half years after he was charged, Mr.
Loya was tried before a jury.

2

After the State presented its evidence, Mr. Loya made a motion for a directed verdict on
the basis that the State failed to establish a prima facie case. R. 169 [119]. The court denied the
motion, R. 169 [120], and Mr. Loya was convicted as charged. R. 129. Mr. Loya submitted a
timely notice of appeal. R. 152-53.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2
Between 9 p.m. on December 29th, 1996 and 6 a.m. on December 30th, 1996 a white
Chevy half-ton truck belonging to SKA Drywall was stolen from the West Jordon home of a
SKA Drywall employee. R. 169 [80-82, 85-86].3
Nearly three months later, on March 17th, 1997, Mr. Loya was at his home in Salt Lake
City when he was visited by two acquaintances, "Jason Tucker" and "Monique." R. 169 [12627] .4 They were driving a white Chevy truck. R. 169 [127], About that time, a friend, "Roger
Porter" telephoned Mr. Loya and asked his help in towing a car. Id Mr. Loya responded that his
truck was broken, but "I told him I'd see what I could do." R. 126 [128]. Mr. Loya asked Jason
to tow the car. Id Jason indicated that he was too busy, but he gave Mr. Loya permission to use
the white Chevy. Id
Mr. Loya noticed that the truck "had a smash on the front fender." Id Jason explained
that his mother "slid off the road into a cop car in Idaho two weeks prior." R. 126 [129]. Mr.

2

Because the evidence must be viewed "'in the light most favorable to the verdict,'"
Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 924, the facts are so stated.
3

The employee, Rob Gines, testified that a neighbor saw the truck leave at 4 a.m. R. 126

[82].
4

Mr. Loya described Monique as an "acquaintance," and explained that he had known
Jason for about six months, and had seen him three or four times. R. 126 [126-27].
3

Loya also found that the ignition was missing. Id Jason told Mr. Loya that the truck had
electrical problems, and showed him how to start the truck by holding in the clutch and rotating
the classic cylinder until the Check Engine light came on. Id At that point, the truck would start.
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Mr. Loya drove the truck to Roger's house in Magna. R. 126 [130]. A flatbed trailer with
a covered car loaded onto it was hooked up to the truck. Id, Mr. Loya and Roger drove to a gas
station to put gas in the truck. Id Then they returned to Roger's house to pick up "Holly," who
needed to go to Grantsville, where the car was being towed. R. 126 [131]. With Mr. Loya
driving, the three went down 21 st South and headed west on the freeway. Id The car cover soon
came off the car and was flapping around. Id Mr. Loya pulled over on a "little side street
heading towards Saltair, right off the side of the freeway," replaced the car cover, and started
tying it down. R. 126 [132].
Shortly beforehand, Deputy Henry Beltran ["Deputy Beltran"] was patrolling Salt Lake
County property in the west Magna area. R. 126 [88-89]. A citizen approached him with
information regarding a white Chevy truck that was pulling a trailer with a car loaded on it. R.
126 [91-93]. Deputy Beltran radioed the information to dispatch and requested that other
deputies aid him in searching for the vehicle. Id Deputy Kevin Scott Barrett ["Deputy Barrett"],
who was working an off-duty job at Cyprus High School, heard the description of the vehicle
over his radio. R. 126 [97-98]. Driving an unmarked patrol car, he soon discovered the vehicle
on 21 st South, State Road 201. R. 126 [98-99]. The vehicle had stopped at the side of the road and
two men, later identified as Mr. Loya and Roger, were replacing a car cover on the car. R. 126
[99]. A third person, later identified as Holly, was sitting in the cab of the truck. R. 126 [101].
Deputy Barrett radioed that he had found the vehicle, and other deputies began to arrive to "back
4

[him] up." R. 126 [100].
The first to arrive was Deputy Kevin Matthews ["Deputy Matthews"]. R. 126 [103].
Deputy Matthews testified that, immediately after his arrival, he asked Mr. Loya to step to the
side of the road to speak with him. R. 126 [105]. Mr. Loya told Deputy Matthews that he had
been driving the truck and that it was loaned to him by a friend. R. 126 [105].5 Mr. Loya's
manner was natural and unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09].6 Deputy Matthews took the vehicle
identification number of the truck and ran a check on it through the National Crime Information
system. Id. He learned that the vehicle had been stolen. R. 126 [106]. He also noticed that the
ignition of the vehicle had been tampered with. Id
Two other officers, Deputy Danny Troester ["Deputy Troester"] and Deputy Jeff
Andreason ["Deputy Andreason"] arrived on the scene. R. 126 [110, 114]. Deputy Beltran also
arrived. R. 126 [93].7 Deputy Troester testified that he looked in the cab of the truck and saw two
scanners. One of them was turned on and was monitoring the same frequency used by the
deputies and dispatchers of the West Magna division. R. 126 [111]. Deputies Andreason and
Beltran also saw the scanner monitoring the West Magna frequency. R. 126 [94-95, 139-40].
This scanner was tucked into the driver's side visor. R. 126 [140].
Mr. Loya was subsequently arrested. R. 126 [132]. At trial, there was conflicting

5

Mr. Loya provided this information to Deputy Matthews on his own accord prior to
being questioned. R. 126 [104-05].
6

After refreshing his memory with transcript of his testimony from the preliminary
hearing, Officer Matthews testified that Mr. Loya's demeanor when he made the statement about
driving the truck was "that he was just driving the Chevy truck like there was no harm in it." R.
126 [107-09].
7

Deputy Beltran testified that when he arrived he saw "about five or six deputies" on the
scene. R. 126 [93].
5

testimony regarding the method used to start the truck. Mr. Loya testified that the truck was
started as follows:
[Y]ou'd rotate [the plastic sleeve on the steering column], I didn't have the clutch
in to push the cylinder with my finger, just stick a pin inside, and rotate it until the
Check Engine light came and push in the clutch and it would start.
R. 126 [134]. On the other hand, Deputy Andreason, who started the truck at the scene, testified
that he was able to start it simply by pushing in the clutch. R. 126 [141]. He also testified that he
"had never seen anything wired like it before that or wired like it since then." R. 126 [146].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Mr. Loya's conviction for Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle should be reversed
because the State failed to present sufficient evidence of intent. The most that the State can
muster, viewing the case in the light most favorable to the State, see Humphrey. 793 P.2d at 924
(in reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, the evidence must be viewed "in the light most
favorable to the verdict'")(citation omitted), is that the white truck was wired, a scanner tuned to
the west Magna police frequency was found in the truck, and Mr. Loya told Officer Matthews
that he was driving the borrowed vehicle. This evidence cannot be stretched so far as to prove
that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was stolen. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-la-1316(2) (1998) (A person commits the crime of receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle
when he has "in his possession any motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer that me knows or has
reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken if he is not a peace officer engaged at the
time in the performance of his duty.")
Evidence that the truck was wired does not support the element of intent because a
vehicle may be wired for many reasons other than that it is stolen. A lack of funds to repair the
6

ignition, a lack of funds to remove a key that has broken off in the ignition, and a lack of funds
to have new keys made when the old ones are lost are common reason for having a wired
vehicle. Among those with limited resources, a wired vehicle is not automatically suspect
because it is easily explained by a lack of funds for repairs. In fact, that was the explanation
given to Mr. Loya in this case. R. 126 [129]. Additionally, Mr. Loya did not know Jason well
and had the truck for only a short period of time, consequently, he did not have enough
information from which to infer that the truck was stolen.
Further, evidence that a scanner in the truck was tuned to the same frequency used by
police does not support the element of intent because the evidence and inferences do not indicate
that Mr. Loya placed the scanner there. Additionally, Mr. Loya did not attempt to evade police
when the news that police were looking for his truck was broadcast over the airwaves. R. 126
[131-32]. In fact, he made himself and his vehicle conspicuous by driving down a major freeway
towing a car with a loose car cover. R. 126 [131]. Then he pulled off the freeway in plain site to
tie down the cover. R. 126 [132].
Finally, evidence that Mr. Loya told Deputy Matthews that he was the driver of the
borrowed vehicle does not support the element of intent. This statement was not an admission or
confession, and was made after Deputy Matthews asked Mr. Loya to step over to the side of the
road for questioning. Deputy Matthews himself indicated that Mr. Loya's manner was natural
and unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09]. Therefore, this evidence does not support that Mr. Loya
knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was stolen.

7

ARGUMENT
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT A QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
THAT MR. LOYA KNEW OR HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE TRUCK
WAS STOLEN, AND RELIED INSTEAD UPON CONJECTURE, MR. LOYA'S
CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED
In arguing that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the truck was stolen, the
State's reliance upon evidence that the truck was started without a key, that scanners were set up
in the truck, and that Mr. Loya admitted to being the driver is fatally weak and amounts to
nothing more than conjecture.
To convict Mr. Loya of Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Vehicle, the State is required
to show that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white Chevy truck was stolen. Utah
Code Ann. § 41-la-1316(2) (1998). In determining whether this element of intent is supported
by sufficient evidence, this Court recognizes that "'[k]nowledge or belief of the stolen character
of goods is seldom directly proved and is usually inferred from the facts and circumstances in
evidence.'" State v. Davis, 965 P.2d 525, 536 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)(quoting State v. Sales. 857
S.W.2d 480,481 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993)). However, the evidence must still be sufficient to support
the jury's verdict "beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Lamm. 606 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1980).
Further, "criminal convictions may not be based upon conjectures or probabilities and before we
can uphold a conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element
of the crime as charged from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Murphy. 617 P.2d 399,402 (Utah 1980).
The evidence, fully marshaled to support the finding that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to
believe that the truck was stolen is as follows:
* The truck was wired. R. 126 [134, 140-42]. Mr. Loya testified that the truck was started

8

by pressing the wiring with a pin, rotating the cylinder, and pressing on the clutch. R. 126 [134].
On the other hand, Deputy Andreason testified that the truck was started simply by pressing on
the clutch. R. 126 [141].8 Deputy Andreason also indicated that the wiring was unusual and that
he had not seen anything like it before. R. 126 [146].
* Two scanners were in the truck, and one of them was tuned to the same frequency used
by the west Magna division of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs office. R. 126 [140, 147]. This
scanner was found tucked in the driver's side visor. R. 126 [140].
* When Deputy Matthews asked Mr. Loya to step over to the side of the road to speak
with him, Mr. Loya indicated, without prompting, that he had been driving the vehicle and that
he had borrowed it from Jason. R. 126 [105]. However, Mr. Loya's manner was natural and
unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09].
This evidence, "stretched to its utmost limits,"9 is not sufficient to infer the element of intent
beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecutor's argument to the contrary, R. 126 [175-78], was
nothing more than conjecture and speculation.
First, evidence that the truck was started without a key is not sufficient to show intent in
light of the unique way that the truck was wired, the fact that Mr. Loya had borrowed the truck
only a short time before, and the reality that wired cars are not unusual among people who have

8

These conflicting testimonies are irrelevant to the issue of whether there was intent
because it is the fact that the truck was wired, rather than how it was wired, which is relevant.
Additionally, three and a half years had passed since the incident in question, neither Mr. Loya
nor Deputy Andreason had written notes concerning the wiring, R. 126 [145-46], and the wired
truck could have been started in a number of ways. Therefore, conflicting testimony regarding
how the truck was wired is not meaningful and is a peripheral matter.
9

See State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983)(Notwithstanding the presumptions
in favor of the jury's verdict, "[t]he evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to
prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.")
9

limited funds with which to make repairs. Deputy Andreason, who has nine years of experience
as a police officer and has seen many stolen cars with wired ignition switches, R. 126 [116, 14546], testified that he had "never seen anything wired like [the truck] before that or wired like it
since then." R. 126 [146]. This strongly suggests that the truck was not wired like that of a
typical stolen car. Thus, even if Mr. Loya was familiar with stolen cars, which the record does
not indicate, this unusual method of wiring would not have indicated to him that the car was
stolen. In fact, the unusual wiring is consistent with the circumstances of someone who needs to
make his vehicle functional, but does not know precisely how to wire it. This is corroborative of
Mr. Loya's understanding that the car was wired due to electrical problems. R. 126 [129].
Additionally, a finding of intent that rests upon the basis that the truck was wired
presupposes that wired vehicles are typically stolen vehicles. This presupposition is not
supported. There are many legitimate reasons for a car to be wired, including the owner's lack of
funds to fix the ignition, lack of funds to remove a key that has broken off in the ignition, and
lack of funds to have new keys made when the old ones are lost. Among people with limited
resources, these are natural reasons for having a wired vehicle. In these circumstances, crediting
Mr. Loya with knowledge that the truck was stolen, particularly where he did not know Jason
well and had borrowed the truck only a short time beforehand, is unreasonable because the
circumstances werenot overtly suspicious. It also imposes upon Mr. Loya the opinions and
attitudes of police officers and those who can always afford car repairs, and does not focus on
whether Mr. Loya himself knew or had reason to believe that the truck was stolen.
Recently, Oxford University Press published a collection of insightful essays by
informed authors regarding poverty and criminal justice. Several of these essays highlight the
increased danger of criminal convictions faced by those with limited funds because their living
10

conditions give rise to erroneous inferences of intent. In one essay, Northwestern University law
professor Dorothy Roberts points out that perceptions of the middle class regarding proper child
care often credits poverty-stricken parents with the intent to neglect their children when the harm
was actually a direct result of the conditions of poverty, not culpable behavior. Dorothy Roberts,
The Ethics of Punishing Indigent Parents, in From Social Justice to Criminal Justice: Poverty
and the Administration of Criminal Law 161, 172-74 (William C. Heffernan et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter Social Justice].10 In another essay, Columbia University law professor George P.
Fletcher recognizes that poverty creates its own set of conditions which are normal given the
lack of resources, and that those who live in these conditions sometimes engage in behavior
which is seen by others as unexpected and therefore indicative of culpability. George P. Fletcher,
Material Poverty - Moral Poverty, in Social Justice 264, 264-66. n

I

Professor Roberts differentiates between parents who are unable to provide adequate
care for their children and those who neglect them due to the stress of poverty. She explains:
Child neglect is sometimes a direct result of the parents' financial inability
to provide for their children. Parents may be guilty of neglect because they are
unable to afford adequate food, clothing, or shelter for their children. These cases
can be distinguished from those . . . where stress resulting from poverty causes
parents to harm their children. This type of neglect is better classified as a crime
defined by poverty rather than a crime caused by poverty. Parents who experience
stress may be held liable for hurting their children because they are nevertheless
capable of conforming to the law. Parents who have no money to provide for their
children's needs, however, are incapable of conforming to the law.
Id at 172.
II

Professor Fletcher indicates that the source of this misunderstanding is as follows:

Each society makes certain demands on its inhabitants and citizens. It expects
them to function in certain ways to earn their bread, to contribute to the group
defense, and to participate in rearing the next generation. Poverty is a condition
that disables people from functioning in the expected manner. It is a handicap
relative to the society in which it occurs.
11

Although these essays examine more severe conditions and more severe crimes than
those at issue here, insights from these essays are directly applicable in this case. The assumption
that a wired car is a stolen car ignores the reality that those without money often wire their cars
because of a lack of funds to repair them. A wired car, therefore, would not seem highly unusual
or suspicious to someone of limited means. In this case, the white truck could easily have been
wired because of the lack of funds for repairs, and in fact, this was the explanation given to Mr.
Loya. R. 126 [129]. Given these circumstances, this evidence cannot be stretched far enough to
support the element of intent required in this case.

Id. at 265-66. He also highlights how certain material circumstances are wrongly perceived by
those living outside of those conditions. He writes:
Poverty could not be defined by the presence of certain physically threatening or
uncomfortable conditions, such as those we typically associate with the American
urban ghettos of the late twentieth century, that is, rat-infested apartments, broken
plumbing, noise, filth, and crowding. For if you took the same conditions and
transferred them to a native American village or the Jewish shtetl of the Middle
Ages, they might even appear luxurious. Imagine: only rats threatening you,
indoor plumbing that words sometimes, occasional pick-up of the trash, paved
streets, doors you could close to keep out the neighbors' stares - not to mention
food available at the corner market (even with food stamps), the possibility of
cooking without chopping wood, occasional heat available in winter, and medical
treatment without leeches.
Id. at 265. Further, he explains that deprivation, even without poverty, may result in erroneous
inferences drawn by outsiders. He writes:
Imagine someone who grows up in an Amish community, with all the comforts of
farm life, but who learns to speak only Pennsylvania Dutch and has never heard
of a computer. There is neither deprivation nor a handicap relative to life within
the community, but if the person chooses to leave the barriers are enormous. I do
not think it is correct to say that life on an Amish farm is a life of poverty, but the
limitations of the lifestyle certainly make it more difficult to function in the
outside society. The same would be true of the kid who grows up speaking only
black English, Southwest Spanglish, or Brooklyn Yiddish.
Id. at 266.
12

Second, evidence that a scanner in the truck was tuned to the same frequency used by the
west Magna division of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs office is not indicative of intent because
Mr. Loya had borrowed the vehicle only a short time beforehand, R. 126 [129-32], there is no
evidence or inference that Mr. Loya owned the scanner, and furthermore, even if he listened to
police activity, this does not show he knew or had reason to believe that the truck he was driving
was stolen. Any inference that Mr. Loya used the scanner to monitor police activity in order to
evade police is unreasonable in light of the evidence. Initially, Mr. Loya made himself
conspicuous by towing a car on a major freeway with a loosely-tied tarp. R. 126 [131]. After a
search for the truck was issued over the airwaves, Mr. Loya did not attempt to conceal himself or
his vehicle. R. 126 [91-93]. Instead, he pulled off the freeway in plain sight, R. 126 [132], got
out of the car, and spent several minutes adjusting the flyaway car cover. IdL This evidence does
not support an inference that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was
stolen.
Finally, evidence that Mr. Loya told Deputy Matthews that he had been driving the
vehicle and that he had borrowed it from Jason does not support an inference of intent. Mr. Loya
made this comment to Deputy Matthews after Deputy Matthews asked him to step over to the
side of the road for questioning. R. 126 [105]. Mr. Loya's manner when he spoke was natural
and unsuspicious. R. 126 [108-09]. Further, there is nothing about Mr. Loya's comment that is
surprising or unusual, given that Mr. Loya had not been pulled over for a traffic stop and there
was no apparent reason for the officer's questioning beyond some problem with the vehicle. The
comment did not amount to an admission or confession.12 Thus, this evidence does not support

12

Confessions "are special types of admissions because they contain admissions of the
criminal act itself and not mere admissions upon which guilt may be inferred." State v. Johnson,
13

an inference of intent.
The element of intent is completely unsupported in this case because there is nothing to
show that Mr. Loya knew or had reason to believe that the white truck was stolen. The most that
can be mustered by the State is that the truck was started without a key, a scanner in the truck
was monitoring the police frequency, and Mr. Loya told an officer at the scene that he had been
driving the truck and that it had been loaned to him by a friend. R. 126 [176-78]. Intent,
therefore, is shown only by conjecture and speculation, and Mr. Loya's conviction cannot be
upheld on this basis. Murphy, 617 P.2d at 402.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Loya respectfully requests that this Court reverse his
conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this
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L

day of May, 2001.

^ W . Mgpv^*^

HEATHER JQKNSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

JOHN O'CONNELL, JR.
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

821 P.2d 1150, 1162 n.7 (Utah 1991). Where statements by a defendant are incomplete, vague,
and unspecific, they don't amount to a confession to specific elements of a crime or to the
requisite mental state. State v. Bolsinger, 699 P.2d 1214, 1218 (Utah 1985).
14
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
CHANGE OF PLEA
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991904376 FS

JERRY DALE LOYA,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDITH S. ATHERTON
December 18, 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
lorip
Prosecutor: POSTMA, MICHAEL E
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): OCONNELL, JOHN D JR
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 28, 1970
Video
Tape Number:
VIDEO
Tape Count: 11.44
CHARGES
1. RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN VEHICLE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/20/2000 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN
VEHICLE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen
years in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

0015C

Case No: 991904376
Date:
Dec 18, 2000

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
COMMITMENT TO RUN CONCURRENT WITH OTHER COMMITMENTS.
Credit is granted for time served
Dated this

/Q day of

JJiC

JUD1TH/S.

ATiilSKTVW "•

Di&trlct Courty Judge

i

O

l/\
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